Is God (perfectly) good? : remarks on Opatrzność Boża, wolność, przypadek by Dariusz Łukasiewicz

The main problem of Dariusz Łukasiewicz’ book is the problem of God’s goodness, especially the question if God is perfectly good (also in moral sense). If He is perfectly good, He should always do what is best in the given circumstances, or—if there is no possibility of doing good—choose the least evil given two or more alternatives. In the paper I argue that God’s perfect goodness could not be justified neither a priori, nor a posteriori. A priori arguments are not conclusive ones because it is not possible to infer moral goodness from such ontological features as simplicity, necessity or infinity. Moral goodness also does not derive from almightiness or omniscience. Quite contrary, almightiness (and omniscience) may even be obstacles to moral goodness; for if God knows everything what is logically possible to know and can do anything that is logically possible to do, then not only should He know evil, but also should be able to do it. A posteriori arguments are not conclusive because of horrendous evil in the world, especially in the nature; after all, there is a natural and inescapable cruelty in nature, a result of the fact that some species are food for other species. Therefore, if God indeed created the world, He cannot have been sensitive to the suffering of the creatures he brought to life, especially that there is a lot of pointless evil in the world we currently inhabit.