Leon Petrażycki and a pluralism of the sources of law

The article pertains to the issue of decentralisation (and democratisation) of sources of law and reconstruction of the concept of sources of law. Models of thinking or categories adopted in jurisprudence oftentimes constitute a manifestation of a repression that is stronger than the classic legal sanction. This is because they necessitate flattening of the social reality image, which tends to be richer than the corresponding law. The aim of this article is to indicate that the scarcity of law stems solely from thinking habits and solutions adopted unquestionably by jurisprudence. This is also the case for the concept of sources of law. The positivist idea that law is created and imposed on citizens by the centre in power (the state, the court) remains relevant, even if there are more than just one centre. At the same time, the concept of sources of law, defended by jurisprudence, excludes any actual displays of pluralism, thus preventing bottom-up law-making processes (perhaps except for soft law of unclear legal status) and recognising their role in the legal system or the legal order of a given state. Pluralism of sources of law is one of the elements of theory of law formulated by Leon Petrażycki. If we assume that the standard positivist model of sources of law is the currently binding one, Petrażycki's concept provides an alternative that allows us to indeed recognise and include into the notion of law all these rules that are in fact something more than morality, habit or custom in view of addressees, while maintaining the integrity and efficiency of law and traditional ways of understanding law in countries of the Enlightenment tradition.